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PARENTAL NOTIFICATION AS A
PREREQUISITE FOR MINORS' ACCESS TO
CONTRACEPTIVES: A BEHAVIORAL AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS

Minors have traditionally been assumed incapable of exercising complete control over their lives. The right to control minors'
behavior has therefore been accorded to parents and to the state.
As a consequence, the aQility of minors to exercise constitutional
and statutory rights has been limited. 1
The regulation of minors' behavior by the state appreciably
diminishes both minors' rights and parents' rights to control their
children. Some state regulations, however, may unconstitutionally infringe on the rights of minors and parents. In determining whether a particular state regulation is constitutional, it is
necessary to balance the asserted state interest against minors'
and parents' rights both separately and in combination.
One recent development, the recognition of a constitutional
"right of privacy" to make procreation-related decisions without
state interference, reflects the special legal status of minors.
Since Griswold v. Connecticut 2 the Supreme Court has relied on
' The special legal status of minors reflects the natural development of human beings
from total inability to care for themselves to physical and psychological maturity. The
Anglo-American legal tradition classified "children before the years of discretion" with
lunatics: "[T]hey do not possess the faculty of forming a judgment on their own interests;
in other words . . . they are wanting in the first essential of an engagement by Contract."
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164 (1st Amer. ed. 1870) (1st ed. London 1861). John Stuart Mill
reflected the traditional view in a more general fashion:
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute . . . .
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children,
or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care ofby others,
must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury.
J.S. MILI., ON LIBERTY 9 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1st ed. London 1859).
Consequently, minors' rights have been limited in such familiar areas as the power to
vote, drink, or enter contracts; minors have also been subjected to other provisions for
their welfare such as compulsory education laws, child labor laws, and a separate judicial
system.
2
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives is unconstitutionally broad and thus impermissibly invades the area of protected freedoms).
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the right of privacy to limit the ability of the state to interfere
with adults' decisions to use contraceptives 3 or to obtain abortions.4 The Court has also interpreted the right of privacy to
provide some protection for minors' decisions even when the state
regulation in question is intended to assist the exercise of parental
authority. 5 The Court, however, has not yet determined the extent to which parental rights encroach on the state's power to
increase the scope of privacy rights which minors themselves may
freely exercise.
This article examines whether the constitutional right of parents to determine what is best for their children prevents the state
from permitting minors access to contraceptives without notifying their parents. 6 Part I examines the effect of the presence or
absence of a notice requirement upon the interests of parents,
minors, and the state. Part II reviews the development of the
3
Id. at 484-86; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (right of privacy inheres
in the individual, not the marital relationship).
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of pri,acy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to have an abortion).
• Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (a state cannot impose a blanket
requirement of parental consent as a condition for an unmarried minor's abortion during
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; the parental interest is "no more weighty than the right
of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant." Id. at 7475).
' This issue arose in Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded mem., 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), aff'd on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich.
1977), reu'd, No. 78-1056 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1980).
Doe was a class action brought by parents of unemancipated minors against the Ingham
County Michigan health board and the Ingham County Family Planning Center to enjoin
the Center from providing minors with contraceptive devices and medications without
prior parental notification and consent. The Center operated on funds provided by the
county health department and by the State of Michigan under a contract which required
the Center to provide services to Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and
Medicaid recipients pursuant to the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
601-644 & 1396-1396i (1976). The Act provides for the availability of family planning
services to program recipients, including sexually active minors. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(15),
1396a(a)(8), & 1396d(a)(4)(c) (1976).
The Ingham County Family Planning Center served minors who voluntarily sought its
services on a confidential basis. The minors were required to attend a "rap session" before
any further services were made available. After a discussion of aspects of sexual activity
and methods and risks of birth control, minors made appointments for medical examinations. Contraceptives were furnished to the minors only if the examination showed no
radical problems.
The district court held that the Center's procedures for the distribution of contraceptives violated the parents' fundamental "right of privacy in the care and control of their
minor children and a right to the free exercise of their religion in the spiritual education
of their children." 428 F. Supp. at 1206. The court concluded that the parents' interests
in controlling their children and in the freedom of the family from state intrusion outweighed both any right of privacy of minors and any state interests served by confidential
provision of contraceptives. Therefore, the state could not constitutionally exclude parents
completely from the child's decision to use contraceptives. Id. at 1214-15. See also Doe v.
Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1261 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
For an account of the Sixth Circuit's reversal, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1980, at A12,
col. 6.
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constitutional right of privacy and the impact of parental rights
and state interests on the extension of privacy rights to minors.
Part ill considers the manner in which the interests of minors,
parents, and the state should be balanced. The article concludes
that statutes requiring prior parental notification of minors' decisions to procure contraceptives do not effectively protect parental
or state interests and unconstitutionally burden the minors' right
of privacy.

I.

INTERESTS AFFECTED BY STATE INVOLVEMENT

The rights of parents which are affected by the provision of
contraceptives to minors are not absolute. In order to be vindicated, those rights must be weighed against the independent interests and rights of the state and minors which have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.7 The basis of the rights asserted in this area is a desire to affect - or control - the behavior
of minors. The weights of the asserted rights in any confrontation
are determined primarily by the degree to which the measures
which are justified by any claim of right can influence the actual
behavior of parents and minors. This section examines the relationships between individuals' sexual behavior, access to contraceptives, and the values and interests sought to be protected by
parental notification requirements.

A.

Parental and Familial Interests

The family occupies a central position in American society. As
a mechanism for teaching social values, it serves as the primary
means by which society maintains its cultural identity. 8 The performance of this social function requires that parents should bear
certain responsibilities and be free to exercise a great discretion
in decisions regarding their children's upbringing. The existence
of family autonomy requires, inter alia, that parent-child disputes are decided by whatever procedures that individual families develop, rather than by socially determined procedures or
institutions. Since parents and children are not social or legal
equals, recognition of a sphere of family automony or privacy
implies state support, generally through non-intervention, of parental control of their children's behavior. Despite the obvious
1
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214 (1972). For a discussion of ~der, see notes 95-97 and accompanying text infra.
8
K. DEUTSCH, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 161 (1970); Hafen, Children's Liberation and

the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights,"
1976

BRIGHAM YOUNG

L.

REV.

605, 615-17 (1976).
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parental domination of the family, children share the parents'
interest in maintaining the family's independence from state supervision. This interest results in part from individuals' desire for
autonomy and in part from the recognition that "law is incapable
of effectively managing, except in a very gross sense, so delicate
and complex a relationship as that between parent and child."'
For example, parental authority and autonomy over their children's religious education is a product of many factors. One factor
is society's reliance on the family as the source of general moral
education. Another is the protection afforded the exercise of religious beliefs. A third factor is resistance to the possibility that the
state might "standardize" children by controlling certain aspects
of their education under the guise of parens patriae. 10
The provision of contraceptives to minors clearly affects these
parental interests in controlling the ~ligious education and the
sexual and contraceptive choices of the child. The availability of
contraceptives from an official source necessarily implies a degree
of official approval of their use. Thus, such availability may be
interpreted by minors as official approval of their sexual activities
rather than as an officially neutral attitude or a recognition by
the state that it cannot control minors' sexual activity. Parents
may understandably believe that this type of state support undermines parental authority by inculcating values relating to
marriage and sexual activity, particularly the use of contraceptives, which may conflict with the values preferred by the parents.
Parental values in the sensitive areas of premarital sexual activity and contraception may be closely related to those parental
values associated with religious beliefs. For example, parents who
disapprove of their children's sexual activity may oppose their
use of contraceptives on the basis of a general opposition to contraceptives or a belief that the minors are more likely to refrain
from sexual activity if contraceptives are unavailable. Other parents may be equally condemnatory of their children's sexual activities but may take the view that, ultimately, they have no
opportunity for immediate input into or control over the children's decision to have sex and that the wisest course is to minimize any further dangers by providing contraceptives to sexually
active minors.
• J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BF.ST INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD 8
(1973).
•• See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972) (Amish parents could withdraw
their children from public schools at age fourteen, despite a state law requiring children's
attendance until age sixteen); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (state
could not prevent parents from sending their children to private schools).
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All four groups of parents would nonetheless share an interest
in protecting the health of their children by participating in the
choice of a particular method of birth control. The different
methods of birth control vary in effectiveness, ease of use, and
associated medical consequences. 11 The contraceptive pill, tht
most effective and popular method, 12 has been reported to increase the risk of a variety of medical problems. In addition, the
long-term effects of using the pill during adolescence before the
establishment of a regular menstrual cycle are unknown." The
necessary weighing of the medical risks and benefits of the alternative methods of treatment is precisely the sort of decision that
parents have traditionally had the right to make for their minor
children. 15
Thus, the state's providing contraceptives on a confidential
basis to minors threatens parental authority and control and the
parent-child relationship in a more pervasive manner than
merely contradicting parental preferences about sex and contraceptives.18 The state's implicit questioning of the value of parental guidance in the sensitive area of sexual mores challenges parental authority as based on inadequate knowledge or on archaic
values. A minor might infer from the state's position that parents
who disagree with the minor's wishes have chosen their position
on a basis other than the minor's best interests. Furthermore,
confidential distribution of contraceptives implies that deception
of one's parents is sometime justifiable. A state program such as
the one attacked in Doe v. Irwin 11 relies on a state agent, who has
11 The effectiveness of different contraceptive methods may vary widely due to proper
or improper use, and may therefore be especially dependent on the quality of the medical
advice received by the user.
12 Over 85% of the patients receiving contraceptives from family planning clinics in
Michigan from January to June 1974 used the pill. R. CARTER & C. NELL, FAMILY PLANNING
SERVICES PROVIDED TO AFDC RECIPIENTS IN MICHIGAN 72 (Studies in Welfare Policy No. 6
1975).
is Possible side effects of the pill include nausea, vaginal discharges, depression, inflammation of veins, and blood clotting. Other methods involve different risks. Intra-uterine
devices (IUDs) may cause irregular bleeding, pelvic pain, and infection or perforation of
the uterus. H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 151-67
(2d ed. 1975).
" See generally H. KATCHADOURIAN & D. LUNDE, supra note 13, at 151-56.
•• W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 102-03 (4th ed. 1971). See generally
Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk of State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L.
REv. 462 (1972); Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975).
" From the parents' viewpoint, the involvement of the state may be more threatening
than the actions of a private individual or organization lacking the authoritative image
of the state.
17 See note 6 supra.

FALL

Parental Notification

1979]

201

only a brief acquaintance with a minor, to replace to some extent
the minor's parents as a source of values and counsel. Parents,
however, are generally far more familiar with their children's
level of maturity and background than is anyone else. It is doubtful that these challenges to parental authority can be limited in
practice to the medical aspects of the minor's contraceptive decision. Religious values are necessarily involved in decisions about
sex and contraception, but if parents are not notified prior to the
decision they may have no opportunity to counsel the child about
the intricacies of an actual sexual relationship. While the decision
to involve the parents would ultimately be the child's, the offer
of a state-supported alternative decreases the likelihood that a
minor will turn to his or her parents for assistance. An expert has
testified that "young people who come for contraceptives may
come for other reasons, also. That is, they really want help. They
want emotional help. They want help with other problems, and
that their sex relations that they are having are simply symptomatic of rather deep-seated, sometimes, emotional problems." 18
The connection between sexual activities and a wide range of
other concerns suggests that it is difficult for minors to separate
the decision whether to use contraceptives from the decision
whether to engage in sex, or to separate medical concerns from
the religious and moral issues involved.

B.

Minors' Interests

The interests of minors in obtaining contraceptives must be
examined within the overall context of their sexual activity. Although both male and female minors engage in sexual relations
and are affected by the consequences of their behavior, the practical impact of minors' sexual activity is much greater on females
than on males. 19
Approximately 1,000,000 females between the ages of fifteen
and nineteen become pregnant each year. 20 Those females constitute about ten percent of all women, and twenty-five percent of
the sexually active women, in that age group. Another 30,000
females under the age of fifteen become pregnant each year. 21 Of
" Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (W.D. Mich.), vacated and remanded mem.,
559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir.), aff'd on remand, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd,
No. 78-1056 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1980).
11
Card & Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage Fathers: The Impact of Early Childbearing on the Parents' Personal and Professional Lives, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 199
(1978).
20
Jaffe & Dryfoos, Fertility Control Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 167, 167 (1976).
"Id.
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those pregnancies in teenagers between the ages of fifteen and
nineteen, two-thirds are unintended, and about sixty percent result in live births. 22 One-third of the children born to minor
women are illegitimate. 23 It is estimated that approximately
2,000,000 sexually active teenaged females do not use any reliable
method of contraception. 2• Pregnancy, childbirth, and the use of
medical contraceptives present risks to every woman's health.
The fatality rate associated with pregnancy and childbirth among
minors, however, is approximately five times that associated with
the use of contraceptives and legal, first-trimester abortions. 25
The births of illegitimate children often have a severe impact
on teenage mothers. In addition to the possibility of social stigma
attaching to both mother and child, possible consequences include early and unstable marriages and subsequent pregnancies, 26
emotional difficulties, financial problems, and interruption or
cessation of the mother's education. 27 The difficulties which
unwed mothers face in attempting to support themselves and
their children are reflected by their disproportionate claim on
social service payments. 28
In light of the scope of these repercussions, minors who attempt
to avoid teenage pregnancy and its problems cannot be said to act
irresponsibly. On the contrary, those sexually active minors who
seek birth control information act more responsibly than those
" Id. See also Zelnick & Kantner, First Pregnancies to Women Aged 15-19: 1976 and
1971, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 11, 13 (1978).
n Jaffe & Dryfoos, supra note 20.
" Id. at 172 (table 10).
21 Tietze, New Estimates of Mortality Associated with Fertility Control, 9 FAM. PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES 74, 75-76 (1977).
11 Approximately 60% of marriages resulting from such pregnancies end within six
years. Furthermore, about 50% of teenaged mothers have a second pregnancy within
thirty-six months of their first delivery. Furstenberg, The Social Consequences of Teenage
Parenthood, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 148, 155-58 (1976). See also McCarthy & Menken,
Marriage, Remarriage, Marital Disruption and Age at First Birth, 11 FAM. PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES 21 (1979).
17 These consequences are also likely to be interdependent. Card & Wise, supra note
19; Furstenberg, supra note 26; Moore & Waite, Early Childbearing and Educational
Attainment, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 220 (1977); Trussell, Economic Consequences of
Teenage Childbearing, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 184 (1976).
11 Households including a woman who bore her first child as a teenage mother received
$4.65 billion of the $9.4 billion distributed by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program (AFDC) in 1975. Further, 61% of the women in AFDC households between the
ages of fourteen and thirty bore their first child while still in their teens. This compares
with a rate of 35% in non-AFDC households. Sixty percent of illegitimate children are
supported by welfare payments. Moore, Teenage Childbirth and Welfare Dependency, 10
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 233, 234 (1978); Moore & Caldwell, The Effect of Government
Policies on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 164, 165
(1977).
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who do not. 29 But the imposition of a notice requirement on the
distribution of contraceptives would not induce minors who are
not receiving birth control services to seek them. 30 The converse
is more likely true. Although a notice requirement may not formally give parents the right to determine whether minors receive
contraceptives, it may deter minors from seeking contraceptives
or allow parents to bring other pressures to bear in order to control
their children's sexual or contraceptive decisions.
A sexually active minor has a clear interest in obtaining accurate information on the medical aspects of contraception and
effective means of preventing pregnancy. Insofar as this decision
depends on medical expertise, a knowledgeable medically-trained
advisor is a preferable source of information. Few parents possess
comparable expertise. The minor therefore is medically better off
with access to advice and contraceptives which is unobstructed
by the intervention of non-medical values. 30
The minor's desire for confidentiality is motivated by his or her
natural inclination toward personal autonomy and the shared
interest in maintaining family relationships with minimal government intervention. The problems caused by a minor's sexual
behavior arise at a time when the development of her separate
identity subjects parent-child relations to numerous strains. 31 A
notice requirement may force minors to discuss sexual matters
with their parents at a time and in a context neither desired nor
prepared for by parents or children.
These tensions and communication difficulties exist in "good"
parent-child relationships as well as in relationships where lack
" A survey of minors' use of contraceptives in 1975 found that of an estimated four
million sexually active teenage women, 1.2 million received contraceptive services from
family planning clinics, and estimated that an approximately equal number were served
by private sources. Dryfoos & Heisler, Contraceptive Services for Adolescents: An
Overview, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 223,223,229 (1978). Another study found that more
than 80% of teenage women seeking contraceptive services from clinics had been sexually
active for more than one year before they first sought a clinic's services. Akpom, Akpom
& Davis, Prior Sexual Behavior of Teenagers Attending Rap Sessions for the First Time,
8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 203, 204 (1976).
'° Parents' general lack of medical expertise does not, of course, mean that their advice
to children on related medical and non-medical issues is worthless. In some instances,
parents may have knowledge of the child's relevant medical history which the child lacks.
To the extent that a medical decision involves non-medical considerations, parents may
be as competent and able to advise their children objectively as a medical expert who Jacka
their familiarity with the child's particular characteristics and general maturity. Parents,
however, may lack the objectivity and ability to consider alternatives which a less
emotionally-involved counselor may possess. Opportunities for confidential medical ex- ·
aminations and counseling, as part of a clinic's program, may also yield additional benefits in related areas, such as veneral disease prevention and treatment.
" See L. STONE & J. CHURCH, CHILDHOOD & ADOLESCENCE 432-38, 460, 481-86 (3d ed.
1973).

204

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:1

of rapport and trust deter minors from confiding in their parents.
The closeness and overall strength of the parent-child bond may
cause a sexually active minor to believe she has failed her parents
and betrayed their trust, just as her parents might believe the
child's sexual activity or pregnancy indicates that they have
failed her. Sexual matters are often difficult to discuss, regardless
of the quality of the relationship between the speaker and listener. Any of these factors may cause a child who is otherwise
open with her parents to avoid discussing her sexual activity with
them especially if she is uncertain how they would react.
The individual autonomy desired by a minor includes the
rights to develop moral and religious values and control of sexual
behavior. Values are derived from many sources, including one's
parents, but the choice of a belief by a person of any age must
ultimately be that person's to make. The interest in determining
which sources may influence a minor's choice of values belongs
to the minor as well as the parents. But the consequences of the
minor's sexual activity fall primarily on the minor, not on the
parents. In addition, the minor's choice of sexual values, as distinguished from values relating to contraception, will affect the
minor's behavior in a way that is almost uniformly uncontrolled
(although not uninfluenced) by parents. Although parents may
have expended much time and energy attempting to teach a child
to behave in certain ways, when sexual values are actually implemented, the capacity to choose is solely the minor's. The indirect
nature of parental control of children's sexual activity raises the
question of whether and to what extent parental notice or control
of access to contraceptives actually aids parental control of minors' sexual values and conduct.
Parental notice and consent requirements and flat prohibitions
on access to contraceptives share certain functional characteristics. If parental notice or consent is required, minors who are
unwilling to confront their parents with their activities are essentially faced with the same choice posed by a ban on access - to
discontinue their sexual activities, to rely on non-medical contraceptive methods, or to assume the risk of pregnancy. Minors who
do consult with their parents pursuant to a notice or consent law
may face effective parental opposition or supervision through formal withholding of consent or more informal pressure. A notice
requirement is more permissive than a consent requirement only
with regard to minors who are both willing to inform their parents
and to risk disapproval and coercion in order to obtain contraceptives. It is likely that most teenagers would not seek contraceptives from a source which notified parents of that fact unless the
adolescents were already willing to discuss their sexual activity
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and contraception with their parents. In those cases, the notice
requirement is likely to be superfluous. In cases where the minor
and parents disagree, a notice requirement would increase potential parental control over subsequent behavior only if the minor
were willing to risk parental disapproval to obtain contraceptives
or if the minor is deterred from sexual activity by the unavailability of contraceptives.
The observed relationship between adolescent sexual activity
and use of contraceptives supports the proposition that a notice
requirement would do little to aid parental control of sexual behavior. The availability of contraceptives does not appear to affect the overall frequency of sexual activity among minors. 32 The
decision to use contraceptives generally does not precede but
rather follows by a considerable period a minor's initial sexual
experience. 33 In most instances, therefore, a minor recognizes the
need for contraceptives well after the optimal period for parental
involvement and guidance.
The only study this author has found which has attempted to
assess the impact of a parental notice requirement indicates that
a notice requirement would not significantly affect minors' sexual
activity or increase parental knowledge or control. 34 The study
found that the parents of fifty-five percent of the minors surveyed
knew of the minor's use of the services of family planning clinics.
An additional nine percent of the respondents said that if a notice
requirement were imposed they would continue to attend the
clinics and inform their parents. Four percent said a notice requirement would cause them to cease their sexual activities
rather than inform their parents. Twenty percent would stop
using the clinic's services, but would use a non-prescription contraceptive, and twelve percent said they would continue their
activities but cease using contraceptives.
Although the results of this survey are not conclusive, they
challenge the basic premise of ·a notice requirement, that minors
will not discuss their sexual activities with their parents unless
forced to do so by the state. The survey also indicates that the
efficacy of a notice requirement is limited as an incentive to
•• Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29, at 206.
ss See, e.g., Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29; Cutwright, Illegitimacy: Myths,
Causes and Cures, 3 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 25 (1971); Jaffe & Dryfoos, supra note 20;
Moore & Caldwell, supra note 28; Settlage, Baroff & Cooper, Sexual Experience of
Younger Teenage Girls Seeking Contraceptive Assistance for the First Time, 5 FAM. PLAN.
PERSPECTIVES 223 (1973).
"' Akpom, Akpom & Davis, supra note 29; Settlage, Baroff & Cooper, supra note 33;
Zelnick & Kantner, Sexual and Contraceptive Experience of Young Unmarried Women
in the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9 FAM. PLAN PERSPECTIVES 55 (1977).
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greater intrafamily communication. Of the forty-five percent of
the minors who it was reported had not informed their parents,
only nine percent believed they would begin discussing their sexual behavior with their parents. That potential gain should be
balanced against the greater number (twelve percent) who responded that they would simply stop using contraceptives. 35

C.

The State's Interests

The state has two interests which are affected by minors' access
to contraceptives. The first is the reconciliation and protection of
the individual and familial interests of minors and parents. The
second is the maintenance of desired social attitudes toward sexual behavior and the minimization of the social costs of adolescent sexual activity.
The state interests that might favor imposition of a parental
notice requirement are primarily, although not exclusively, based
on the same considerations which lead the state to place primary
responsibility for child-rearing with parents. To fulfill that responsibility, the state must act to support rather than to undercut the actions and authority of its chosen agents. Such support
may also protect the state's interest in maintaining the family as
a fundamental social unit. Furthermore, since limitations on
minors' rights are based on the presumption of their lesser capacity to make informed, mature decisions, the involvement of parents in the decision-making process may increase the probability
of those preferable choices.
The state may also desire to foster certain values regarding
sexual behavior and to deter premarital and/or promiscuous sexual activity among minors through a notice requirement. The
achievement of these goals would depend on the nature and
strength of any causal relationships between minors' sexual activity, the availability of contraceptives, and parental knowledge
and oversight of minors' behavior. Regardless of whether a notice
requirement is justified on the basis of parental rights alone or in
15
Torres, Does Your Mother Know . .. ?, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 280 (1978). The
survey covered the responses of 1,442 single females under the age of eighteen attending
fifty-three family planning clinics in Arizona, California, Illinois, Missouri, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Washington.
The Ingham County Family Planning Center, one of the defendants in Doe v. Irwin,
estimates that during the period of approximately three months in 1975 in which the
district court's injunction requiring parental notice was in effect before the stay pending
appeal, clinic attendance by minors dropped to between 10% to 20% of its former level.
Telephone conversation with Ms. Ann Olesak, Family Planning Educator, Ingham County
Family Planning Center, Michigan.
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combination with the state's interests, the requirement would
affect minors in the same manner.
If the state is willing to distribute contraceptives to minors, it
may be neutral as to whether or not a minor receives and uses
them. The state cannot, however, be neutral as to who has the
right to make the final decision whether or not to use contraceptives. If minors have that right then the procedures by which they
exercise it should not be set up in a manner which unnecesssarily
deters sexually active minors from receiving contraceptives with- ·
out by the same token increasing parental abilities to protect
minors, or achieving other important social goals. Such procedures would undermine the effectiveness of the state's policy
without furthering its goal of protecting minors and society from
undesired consequences of their actions; the available evidence
indicates that the state's policies with respect to contraceptives
and abortion affect only the rates of adolescent pregnancies and
childbirth but do not affect overall sexual activity. 38
The costs to the state of sexual activity of minors include the
costs to the minors - illegitimate births, venereal disease, the
loss of social productivity by individuals forced to interrupt or
forego education - and the costs of supporting those young mothers and their children who receive welfare payments. The financial expense of the delivery and care of an AFDC recipient for one
year is approximately fourteen times the cost of the family planning services needed to avert one birth. 37 The state's interest ii:t
the welfare of minors and in protecting society as a whole against
such burdens are advanced by maximizing the voluntary use of
contraceptives by sexually active minors.
The impact of a notice requirement on family relationships
depends on the use of family planning services by minors who are
willing to allow the state to notify parents of their actions although not willing to confront their parents directly. Regardless
of what minors' rights to engage in sex or to use contraceptives
are, minors generally are able to keep their sexual activities secret
from their parents. The absence of a notice requirement would
Moore & Caldwell, supra note 18 at 165, 168.
R. CARTER & C. NELL, supra note 12, at 45. Another source has estimated the annual
cost of providing effective contraceptive services at $66 per client. Moore, supra note 28.
One study concluded that the $584 million invested from 1970 to 1975 by the federal
government in family planning programs resulted in short-term savings to government
health and welfare services of $1.1 billion. Eighty percent of the savings were derived from
the costs of pregnancy-related medical care, and twenty percent represented savings from
the costs of public assistance. Long-term savings and benefits were not included in the
study. Jaffe & Cutright, Short-Term Benefits and Costs of U.S. Family Planning
Programs, 1970-75, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 77, 80 (1977).
11
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not prevent either parents or minors from discussing sexual or
contraceptive issues within the family. Since the availability of
confidential treatment generally does not have a causal relation
to minors' sexual activities, a notice requirement would rarely
support parental authority or control in an effective manner.
However, given the strong probability of a deterrent effect of a
notice requirement, the state's interests in minimizing undesirable consequences of minors' sexual activities with minimal interference in family affairs indicates that a policy of confidentiality
best serves those state interests.
II.

THE

RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND MINORS

The recognition of a constitutional right of privacy which protects individual decisions regarding procreation implies some extension of that right to minors. The extent of minors' privacy
rights has thus far been only partially defined by the United
States Supreme Court. The hesitation to extend to minors the
same privacy right accorded adults reflects both the gradual development of the right of privacy itself and the traditional view
that state regulations may limit minors' rights to a greater degree
than adults' rights. Minors' rights have also been viewed as necessarily limited by the authority of parents to control their children,
although parental rights have usually been considered in the context of parent-state competition for control of minors rather than
in direct parent-child conflicts.
A.

The Right of Privacy

The freedom of individuals to decide whether to conceive or
bear children has been increasingly protected against state regulation since 1965 by the recognition of a fundamental constitutional right of privacy. Griswold u. Connecticut 38 began this process by invalidating a state statute which prohibited the use of
contraceptives, as the statute applied to suppliers of contraceptives who were convicted as accessories. The Supreme Court emphasized the social importance of the marital relationship and
the unacceptability of intrusion into "the sacred precincts of the
marital bedroom" to enforce the prohibition. 39 The source of constitutional protection for the right of privacy was identified by the
Court as the "penumbras" of the specific protections embodied
33
381 U.S. 479 (1965) .
., Id . .at 485-86.
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in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 40
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
used by the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird' 1 to extend to single
adults the same right of access to contraceptives as married persons have. The Court identified the right of privacy as an individual rather than a relational right:
[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the
unmarried and the married alike . . . . It is true that in
Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity . . . but an association of two individuals
. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.42
The fundamental nature of the right of privacy was emphasized
by the Court in Roe v. Wade. 43 The Court clarified the source of
the right as the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and noted that it extends to decisions about marital and
family relationships, procreation, contraception, child rearing,
and education.4' Roe struck down a Texas statute which outlawed
abortions other than those necessary to save the mother's life.
The Court stated that the right of privacy included the woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 45 Thus, it
concluded that any state regulations limiting the exercise of that
discretion must be narrowly drawn and justified by a compelling
state interest. 48
The opinion identified three important state interests: protecting the mother's health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life. 47 The state interests involved were balanced
•• Id. at 484. The concurring opinions cited other constitutional sources of the privacy
right, e.g., the Ninth Amendment as protective of a fundamental right of privacy, id. at
498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring), and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) & 502 (White, J., concurring in
judgment).
" 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 152-53.
"Id. at 153.
" Id. at 153-55.
" Id. at 154.
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against the relative dangers to the mother from abortion and
childbirth. The Court found that the state's interest in the
mother's health does not become compelling until the risks of
childbirth are at least equal to the risks of abortion, while its
interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling only
when the fetus "presumably has the capacity for meaningful life
outside the mother's womb." 48 The Court's reliance on thencurrent medical knowledge to balance and define those risks and
interests49 implies that the extent of the individual's privacy right
and the state's ability to regulate the abortion decision may
change as developments in medical science alter the relative risks
of abortion and childbirth. The Court also held, however, that the
state did not have a legitimate interest in imposing a moral view
upon women through regulation of the abortion decision. 50
Eisenstadt and Roe clearly establish that adults possess a fundamental right of privacy protecting their choices whether to conceive and bear children. Furthermore, any regulations limiting
that right must take into acount the medical risks involved in
order not to intrude upon the protected area. 51

B.

The Rights of Minors

The law has traditionally restricted minors' rights and activities more than those of adults. Such restrictions have been justified by a belief that minors lack the maturity necessary to understand the consequences of their actions. 52 The restrictions placed
on their activities represent both attempts to protect minors from
themselves, e.g., limits on minors' ability to contract, drink, or
drive, and to prepare minors to function effectively as adult citizens, e.g., compulsory education. 53
'" Id. at 163-64.
" Id .
.. "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." Id. at 162. The state, however, need not
be neutral, according to the Court. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court held
that a state's refusal to fund elective abortions for indigent women through Medicaid did
not violate equal protection. Roe v. Wade was interpreted by the Court to have
"implie[d] no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds." 432 U.S. at 474.
51
"[Al governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1963), quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
•• See note 1 supra.
53
See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS or
THE CHILD (1973); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BRIG. YouNG L. REv. 605 (1976);
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The constitutional rights of minors can only be discerned by
balancin,:,; the express language of the constitution, which does
not distinguish between adults and minors, and the common law
tradition of according limited rights to minors. The Supreme
Court has been most active in defining and extending the due
process rights of minors. It has also been active in judging minors'
First Amendment claims, holding that minors' lack of the "full
capacity for individual choice" justifies restrictions on their First
Amendment rights. 55 It has not, however, interpreted the due
process clause as providing protections to minors equal to those
which it provides to adults. The Court recently summarized its
ruling on minors' rights as having "recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability
of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child-rearing." 58
The Court has, furthermore, dealt with minors' rights of access
to abortions and contraceptives in the recent cases of Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth 57 and Carey v. Population Services
International. 58 In Roe v. Wade, the Court had expressly refused
Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their Parents, and the State (pts. I-III),
4 FAM. L.Q. 320, 410 (1970), 5 FAM. L.Q. 64 (1971); Note, State Instrusion Into Family
Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1974).
" See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring notice and hearing before
temporary disciplinary suspension from school); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (denying constitutional right to jury trial in the adjudicative phase of state juvenile
court proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (setting reasonable doubt standard
for conviction of a juvenile in a criminal prosecution); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(providing right to written notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and privilege
against self-incrimination in juvenile court adjudications). The court noted in In re Gault,
however, that juvenile delinquency hearings need not "'conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.'" Id. at 30 (footnote
omitted).
" Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
Ginsberg upheld a New York statute barring the sale to minors of sexually-oriented literature that concededly was not obscene with respect to adults. The Court rejected the
argument that the statute unconstitutionally defined obscenity and, therefore, the scope
of minors' freedom of expression on the basis of the buyer's age. The statute's restrictions
of. minors' rights were held justified by the state's power to regulate minors to a greater
extent than adults, its interest in supporting parental authority, and the state's independent interest in minors' welfare. Id. at 638-40. But see Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' right of free speech under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments if such expression does not materially and substantially interfere
with the school's operation).
51
Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3043 (1979). For a discussion of Bellotti, see notes
70-79 and accompanying text infra .
•, 428 us. 52 (1976) .
.. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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to consider the extent of unmarried minors' rights in an abortion
decision. 59 Danforth concerned the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting abortions, other than those necessary to save the
mother's life, from being performed on women under the age of
eighteen during the first trimester of pregnancy without the parents' written consent. The Court recognized that the state's interest in protecting parental authority and family stability might
provide a basis for greater regulation of minors' abortions than
the regulation rejected for adults in Roe. Nevertheless, the Court
found fault with the statute's delegation to parents of an
"absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" power that the state itself, under Roe, did not possess. 80 It further found that
"significant state interest" in maintaining the family and parental authority did not justify the statute's restrictions on minors.
The Court was not convinced that parental control of the abortion
decision could effectively protect that interest: "Neither is it
likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or
control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so
fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy
already has fractured the family structure." 81 The Court rejected
the argument that parental interests might support the statute's
requirements: "Any independent interest the parent may have in
the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant." 82 The Court refused, however,
to hold that the privacy right of minors is equal to that of adults:
"We emphasize that our holding . . . does not suggest that every
minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent
for termination of her pregnancy." 83
In the companion case of Bellotti v. Baird 84 the lower court had
invalidated a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent
or an order from the state superior court before a minor could
obtain an abortion. 85 The Supreme Court indicated that it was
willing to accept as constitutional some state-mandated parental
involvement in the minor's abortion decision. It also indicated,
however, than an absolute parental notice or consultation requirement might not be upheld. The court observed that the
•• 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67.
80
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
" Id. at 75.
" Id.
" Id.
" 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
" Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated and remanded, 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
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interpretation advanced by the State of Massachusetts was that
the statute
prefers parental consultation and consent, but . . . permits a mature minor capable of giving informed consent
to obtain, without undue burden, an order permitting the
abortion without parental consultation, and, further, permits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent to
obtain an order without parental consultation where there
is a showing that the abortion would be in her best interests. The statute, as thus read would be fundamentally
different from a statute that creates a "parental veto". 66
Since the Court found the statute open to varying constructions,
it remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
refer the issues of construction to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. 67
That court construed the statute to require parental notice of
all proceedings instituted by minors seeking judicial consent to
abortions. 68 The district court again invalidated the statute, holding in part that the absolute notice requirement impermissibly
burdened minors' rights by prohibiting judicial consent to abortions without parental notification even when the court found
that parental involvement would not be in the minor's best interests. 69
In Bellotti v. Baird, 70 the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. Justice Powell's plurality opinion noted the reasons for the
greater latitude allowed to state regulation of minors' rights 71 and
recognized the frequent requirement of parental involvement or
consent in important decisions by minors as an appropriate
method of protecting minors from their own immaturity. 72 However, the differences between other choices made by minors subject to state regulation, e.g., the decision to marry, and the constitutional status of the right involved in Baird "require a State to
act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental
"
"
"
"

428 U.S. at 145 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 146-52.
Baird v. Attorney General,_ Mass.-, 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (1977).
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
1
• Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979). Justice Powell announced the Court's judgment in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun. Justice White was the sole dissenter.
71
See text accompanying note 56 supra.
12
99 S. Ct. 3035, 3045 & 3047 (1979).
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involvement in this matter." 73 Danforth's prohibition of any absoh1te third party veto over the abortion decision led Justice Powell
to the conclusion that when a state requires minors to obtain
parental consent to abortions, it must also provide an alternate
authorization procedure through which minors may procure abortions.7'
Justice Powell found the judicial proceeding provided by the
Massachusetts statute unsatisfactory in two respects. One aspect
found defective by both Justice Powell's and Justice Stevens'
plurality opinions was the authority given to the superior court
to deny consent for an abortion on the grounds that the abortion
would not be in the minor's best interests even if the judge determined that the minor was mature and was capable of making and
had made a reasonable and informed choice. Both pluralities say
that this potential judicial disregard of a mature minor's decision
provides a third party with the kind of absolute and possibly
arbitrary veto which Danforth had declared unconstitutional. 75
The requirement that the court base its decision solely on the
minor's best interests did not save the statute. That standard was
considered to provide insufficient guidance to the judge, causing
the decision to "necessarily reflect personal and societal values
and mores whose enforcement upon the minor - particularly
when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision - is
fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decisions." 78 More precisely,
the district court had held unconstitutional the statute's requirement that parents receive notice of all judicial proceedings instituted by minors to obtain abortions. 77 The two Supreme Court
pluralities diverged in their response to this issue. Justice Stevens
wrote that because the case involved an absolute third party veto
and was governed by Danforth, "[n]either Danforth nor this case
determines the constitutionality of a statute which does no more
than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any
other third party an absolute veto." 78
1
• Id. at 3047.
" Id. at 3048.
75
Id. at 3052 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) & 3053 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
" Id. at 3054 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This defect, however, appears
to be more theoretical than practical. A judge who decides that an abortion is not in a
minor's best interests would be unlikely to conclude that the minor is mature and has
made a reasonable decision, especially in the absence of an objective standard by which
the minor's maturity can be determined.
77 Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (D. Mass. 1978), af/'d, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
" Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3053 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Powell, however, agreed with the district court that the
uniform notice requirement unconstitutionally burdened minors'
rights. The opinion recognized that pregnant minors, particularly
those living at home, would be vulnerable to parental efforts to
prevent an abortion or access to a court in pursuit of an abortion.
This potential obstruction led Justice Powell to the conclusion
that state regulation similar to that of Massachusetts must allow
minors to obtain judicial consent to an abortion and to act on that
authorization without prior parental notice. 79
In Carey v. Population Services International, 80 the validity of
a New York statute that, in part, prohibited all distribution or
sale of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen was
challenged. In a plurality opinion, Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, and Blackmun, with Justices White, Powell and Stevens concurring in the result, held the statute unconstitutional.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, noted that
"the right of privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as adults." 81 The opinion found
two flaws in the statute - the absolute nature of the ban, and
the lack of any evidence supporting the state's assertion that the
ban furthered the goal of deterring sexual activity among minors.
In dealing with the absolute prohibition Justice Brennan reasoned: "Since the State may not impose a blanket prohibition,
or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice
of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a
blanket prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed. " 82 The statute was also found to be
both an ineffective and improper means of furthering the asserted
state interest. Although the opinion did not pass on the question
of whether and to what extent the state may regulate private
sexual activity, it rejected the argument that the state may discourage such activity by increasing the risks involved, especially
in light of "a conceded complete absence of supporting evidence"
that the regulation in fact deterred any sexual activity. 83
The plurality opinion, citing Danforth, stated that restrictions
" Id. at 3050 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
'° 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
" Id. at 693.
" Id. at 694. Justice Powell concurred in the result on the grounds that the statute
violated the rights of married women aged fourteen to sixteen, and also violated the rights
of parents to provide their minor children with contraceptives. Id. at 707-08 (Powell, J.,
concurring in result).
" Id. at 696. Justice Stevens noted, "It is as though a State decided to dramatize its
disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets. One need not posit a
constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to characterize such a restriction as irrational and
perverse." Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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on minors' privacy rights need to be justified only by a showing
of a "significant state interest" rather than a "compelling state
interest." 84 The less demanding test was found appropriate because of the state's traditionally greater latitude in regulating
minors' activities and the status of minors' capacity in decisions
regarding abortion and contraceptives. 85 The meaning of the
"significant state interest" test is unclear, but it apparently is a
functional equivalent of the stricter standard. 86
Another way to view the relationship between minors' fundamental rights and the regulatory latitude of the state is to recognize that the state possesses certain interests which are
"compelling" only with respect to minors. The significant state
interest test implies that minors' fundamental rights are qualitatively inferior to those of adults. Maintenance of the compelling
state interest test would focus on the relationship between the
minor's maturity and the exercise of the restricted right as well
as the impact of the relationship on the asserted state interest.
The emphasis on the minor's capacity would be appropriate,
since it is the minor's presumed lack of capacity that justifies all
limits on the rights of minors qua minors. 87
This analysis also turns on the nature of the asserted right. One
commentator has generally classed the fundamental rights involved in minors' rights cases as "protection" and "choice"
"' Id. at 693 & 693 n.15 .
.. Id. at 693 n.15.
" Id. at 706 (Powell, J., concurring in result): "Until today, I would not have thought
it was . . . necessary to review state regulation of this sort under a standard that for all
practical purposes approaches the 'compelling state interest' standard."
87 In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Stewart expressed the view that
[t]he Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free choice. Such a society
presupposes the capacity of its members to choose . . . . I think a State may
permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child
. . . is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I
should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other rights-the right to
marry, for example, or the right to vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults.
Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring in result) (footnotes omitted); accord, Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 75, 104-05 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Justice Stewart's analysis suggests that the crucial issue in determining the rights of
minors is what type and level of capacity constitutes the capacity presupposed by constitutional guarantees. In the context of access to contraceptives, the capacity to conceive a
child is clearly relevant. Arguments that additional qualities of emotional or psychological
maturity should be considered critical appear to be aimed at controlling sexual behavior
rather than contraceptive choices alone and presuppose a causal link between the availability of contraceptives and sexual activity. As noted previously, however, there is no
evidence supporting that assumption with respect to minors in general. See note 33 and
accompanying text supra.
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rights. 88 "Protection rights," generally, are those which shield an
individual from undue harm or interference by the state or other
individuals. "Choice rights" protect the individual's ability to
make affirmative choices of "binding consequences," such as
rights to vote, to contract, or to marry. 89
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding minors' rights in juvenile court and school disciplinary proceedings 90 show the influence of these considerations. Due process concerns protect individuals from abuses of state power and improve the fairness of
adversary adjudications. Thus, due process rights are of relatively
constant value regardless of the individual party's maturity. The
value of restrictions placed on choice rights, however, obviously
does vary directly with levels of maturity.
Minors' rights of access to contraceptives and abortions combine qualities of both choice and protection rights. To the extent
that the availability of contraceptives or abortions influences
minors' decisions about sexual activity, the relevant privacy right
functions as a choice right. Insofar as minors' sexual activities are
not precipitated by access to contraceptives or abortions, the
right of access serves to protect minors from themselves in an area
in which they are uniquely capable of minimizing the consequences of possibly immature and incorrect choices. When one
recognizes the general lack of causality between minors' sexual
activity and access to contraceptives, 91 and the significant dangers of deterring minors from using contraceptives without also
deterring their sexual activities, it appears especially unreasonable to subject only those minors who act responsibly by seeking
contraceptives to a uniform parental notification requirement.
Minors who do not use contraceptives or rely on non-medical
means would be unaffected by the requirement-they would not
be induced to consult their parents or to change their sexual
behavior or contraceptive choices. With respect to those sexually
active minors who do use contraceptives, the right of access serves
a definite prophylactic function against the undesirable consequences to the minors and society in general. The dominance of
the protective aspects of the privacy right suggests that capacity
requirements be minimized and that limitations on minors' access to contraceptives be justified by clear evidence that the limitations would achieve their intended goals significantly more fre88
Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BRIG. YOUNG L. REv. 605, 644 (1976).
" Id. at 644.
'° See cases cited in notes 54-55 supra.
11
See note 33 supra.
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quently than they would increase the risks of irreparable harm to
minors and society.

C.

Parental Rights and the Limitation of Minors' Rights

The rights of parents to control their children must be weighed
against the privacy rights of minors. 92 In cases where parental
rights have conflicted with state regulations, the Supreme Court
has usually favored parental rights. In these cases, where the
Court has affirmed the fundamental nature of parental rights, the
state had completely pre-empted parental authority. In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 93 the Court invalidated a state law requiring
parents to send their children to public schools. The Court found
that the state had no power to "standardize" children in that
fashion: "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." 94 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 95 the Court upheld the
rights of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to high
school in defiance of a state law requiring minors to attend school
until age sixteen. Pierce was interpreted by the Court in Yoder
to stand "as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children." 98 The cultural foundation of
parental rights was explicitly recognized: "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of. parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. " 97
The source of parental rights recognized by the Court in these
cases, however, is ill-defined. The rights could be derived from
the right of the family as a unit to be free from undue state
interference. Alternatively, parents could have certain rights to
control their children that are independent of minors' rights and
exist apart from the authority delegated to parents by the state
to safeguard the social interest in minors' welfare. The ambiguity
results in part from the presumed identity of interests between
parents and children in these cases and the consequent lack of
consideration of minors' rights as independent checks on parental
12
13

."
••
,.
"

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
268 U.S. 510 (1925) .
Id. at 535.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 232.
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rights, 98 and in part from the extent of the contested regulatory
interference with the rights of both parents and minors. It is
interesting to note that both Pierce and an earlier case, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 99 rested on due process grounds rather than free exercise of religion claims. Meyer stated that the due process clause
protected the parents' right to hire a foreign language instructor
for their children and the teacher's right to teach as within the
"liberty" protected by the fourteenth amendment, while Pierce
stated that the inability of the state to require that all minors
attend public schools exclusively was due to limits placed on the
state by "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose. " 100
The Court has since made it clear, however, that the family and
parental authority are not completely free from state regulation.
In Prince v. Massachusetts, 101 the Court upheld a statute prohibiting minors from selling newspapers or magazines in the streets
and adults from giving minors articles to sell, as it applied to a
Jehovah's Witness who was enthusiastically accompanied by her
ward-niece while she sold religious literature on the streets. The
Court rejected the argument that the law unconstitutionally limited the free exercise and expression rights of both the adult and
the minor and the guardian's right of control and education. Although the Court acknowledged the primary role of parents in
childrearing, it noted that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty . . . . [A]nd neither rights or religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation." 102 In Yoder, the Court observed that
state regulation of parental power and free exercise interests
could meet the compelling state interest test "if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child,
or have a potential for significant social burdens." 103
18
In Yoder, the Court rejected Justice Douglas' argument that the case involved the
rights of Amish minors apart from their parents' rights, on the basis that (1) the children
were not parties to the litigation, (2) Wisconsin had not argued that the parents were
preventing children who wanted to attend high school from doing so, and (3) Wisconsin
was attempting to enforce penalties against the parents without regard to the children's
wishes. The Court recognized that, had Wisconsin asserted an interest in protecting Amish
minors who wished to attend public school, "[r ]ecognition of the claim of the State in
such a proceeding would . . . call into question traditional concepts of parental control
over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this
Court's past decisions." 406 U.S. at 231.
,. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting instruction in foreign
languages to anyone not yet graduated from the eighth grade).
100
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
101
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
102
Id. at 166.
103
406 U.S. at 233-34.
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BALANCING RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

The Supreme Court has clearly accepted the propositions that
minors possess a fundamental right of privacy and that that right
includes both the decision to prevent pregnancy and the decision
to terminate pregn~ncy. 104 It has also, however, recognized that
minors' rights of access to contraceptives may be limited by the
state in furthering its own "significant" or "compelling" interests, or in protecting superior parental rights. The state could
decide instead, however, that the general welfare would be benefited more if contraceptives were available to minors on the same
basis as to adults.
The right of minors to obtain contraceptives should be accorded the same weight against competing state interests as the
corresponding adult right of access. As Justice Powell noted in
Bellotti, the dangers of sexual activity without contraception are
at least as great to minors as to unmarried adults, and the individual's interest in controlling the decision to conceive a child is
not totally dependent on the individual's age or maturity .105 Although the contraception decision involves capacity to make
medical decisions, the state's requirement of medical consultation and prescription as a condition of access to potentially harmful methods minimizes the significance of the user's lack of capacity in the exercise of this aspect of the privacy right.
The interests of the state may be thought to be best protected
by recognition of minors' right of access without parental notice.
The extension of minors' rights would effectively further state
interests in minimizing the social costs of teenagers' sexual activity. The lack of any evidence indicating that the availability of
contraceptives causes any increase in the overall rate of minors'
sexual activity leads to the conclusion that morally neutral, utilitarian principles about contraception support a state's position
favoring minors' rights over parental rights in this context. 106
The source of parental rights may influence the weight they are
to be given when balanced against minors' rights or the state's
perception of its own interests. To the extent that parental rights
are based on a delegation of authority by the state, parental rights
are less persuasive against state limitation based on determinations of general welfare. Some aspects of parental rights are
clearly subordinate to such legislative decisions concerning what
10
• Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
Accord, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
00
' Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048 (1979).
,.. See note 33 supra.
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the public interest requires. For example, legislation lowering the
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen is within the constitutional power of the state, although such legislation completely
eliminates parental rights over certain children. Insofar as parental rights are derived from rights protected from state interference, such as due process rights or "a right of privacy older than
the Bill of Rights," 107 however, those rights must be given priority
over at least some arguments based on general welfare determinations.
Parental rights and those state interests asserted to justify a
notice requirement must also be valued in light of the efficacy of
the chosen means and other foreseeable effects. Regardless of the
level of interest the state may ultimately be required to show,
regulations concerning notification must still employ means
which are necessary to, and capable of, achieving their goal. 108
Therefore, whether the state is attempting to further its goals, or
to protect parents' interests, the means used must be reasonably
related to the goal sought without unduly burdening minors' privacy rights.
Since the available evidence indicates that the availability of
contraceptives does not affect most minors' decisions about their
sexual activities, a notice requirement would be essentially a
method of propaganda. It would be merely an expression of social
disapproval of minors' sexual activity and of support of parental
authority. 109 It would communicate that disapproval without controlling minors' behavior, since the choice to consult with parents
would still remain exclusively with minors. The requirement
would not do anything directly to alter parent-child relationships
in ways that might encourage greater communication. With the
variety of options available to minors, 110 the incentive for minors
to consult with parents would be extremely weak. Such an effort
to communicate disapproval must be justified by a compelling or
significant state interest if its result is substantially to burden or
deter the exercise of minors' right of access to contraceptives,
thereby randomly increasing the risks of pregnancy to minors. 111
"' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
"' Carey, 431 U.S. at 686; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973) (invalidating abortion procedure requirements beyond the attending physician's approval).
'°' See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
110
See text accompanying note 35 supra.
111
Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (majority opinion) & 715 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972). With respect to the standard of review
involved, the Carey Court said:
[T]he same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's
right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially
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It appears likely that a significant number of minors would
rather take the risks of unprotected intercourse than confront
their parents with their sexual activities. 112 State legislatures have
already recognized the strength of minors' desires for privacy and
the potential of parental involvement for counterproductive deterrence in sex-related matters by permitting minors by statute
to consent to treatment for venereal disease. 113 These provisions
implicitly recognize that too many minors, knowing they have a
venereal disease and cognizant of its dangers, will not ask their
parents for assistance. The dangers of not using contraceptives
are less certain and more avoidable than those of venereal disease. Even though a notice provision is superficially not as strong
a barrier to access to contraceptives as a consent requirement is
to venereal disease treatment, minors may be more willing to
forego contraceptives than medical treatment. From the minor's
viewpoint, parents would be more likely to react favorably to a
request for venereal disease treatment than to notice of the
minor's sexual activities.
A notice requirement is equally unlikely to protect state and
parental interests in the quality and stability of family relationships or parents' moral authority. The lack of a notice requirement would not prevent parents or children from raising any
issues for family discussion. With respect to a minor's sex life, the
choice whether to involve the parents in any way remains within
the minor's control despite any parental notice requirements.
The limitations on minors' i'ights are justified by a desire to
minimize the possibility of harm to minors in certain situations.
The limitations are implemented through either a statemandated choice or by delegation of the right of choice to parents.
The interest in a correct medical choice involved in the contraceptive decision is best served by the assistance of a physician;
it is doubtful that parental advice would improve such a medical
decision. The value of parental involvement is further weakened
by the relatively small medical risks to the minor posed by contraceptives and the reversibility of the decision. The function of
limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state
statutes that prohibit the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be
justified only by a •~ompelling state interest' . . . and . . . must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."
431 U.S. at 688 (citation omitted).
112 Torres, supra note 35.
113 See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. § 44-132.01 (1978-79 Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-629,
82-630 & 82-631 (1976); CAL. C1v. CODE § 34.7 (West Supp. 1979); Cow. REV. STAT.
§ 25-4-402 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-89a (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13
§ 708 (1974). See also Paul, Pilpel & Wechsler, Pregnancy, Teenagers and the Law, 1976,
8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 16 (1976).
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the minor's privacy right as a protection against the undesired
consequences of sexual activity and the possibility of negative
parental reactions support the minimization of any capacity requirement and for allowing parental involvement to be the result
of the natural development of parent-child relations. The only
reasonable level of capacity required to make a contraceptive
decision in consultation with a physician is the capacity to expose
oneself to the risks guarded against by contraception. There is no
reason to believe that state-mandated parental involvement in
the minor's contraceptive decision will enhance parental authority or the parent-child relationship if the minor does not already
trust the parents enough to confide voluntarily in them. Thus, the
minor's interest in avoiding pregnancy, venereal disease or other,
adverse consequences, should outweigh the state's and parents'
interests in the minor's use of contraceptives and the speculative
benefits expected from parental involvement in the contraceptive
decision. 114
CONCLUSION

A requirement that parents be notified of their minor children's
use of or desire to use contraceptives fails to serve any significant
state interest in deterring the sexual activity of minors and fails
to protect the interests of parents and the state in the minor's
welfare, parental authority, or family stability. A notice requirement - and any other more restrictive regulations - rather only
would increase the risks to minors of pregnancy and venereal
disease, with their consequent personal and social costs. It is
understandable and laudable that parents would want to be involved in guiding their children's decisions about sex and contraceptives. Parents, however, should look to themselves to establish
sufficiently strong relationships with their children to make state
intervention unnecessary. The state has less burdensome methods available to protect its interests, such as sex education programs in public schools. The privacy rights of minors to prevent
conception should be protected against state or parental infringement through such an empty symbolic measure as a notification
requirement.

-Michael N. Finger
"' Cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75: "Any independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."

